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NEVER LOOK BACK: NON-REGRESSION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Nicholas S. Bryner*
ABSTRACT
Deregulatory advocates often frame environmental protection and
economic well-being as a zero-sum tradeoff. During times of economic crisis,
including the long-term fallout from the global covid-19 pandemic, policymakers
may seek to withdraw or roll back environmental laws and regulations in an
attempt to accelerate economic recovery. In order to safeguard the interests of
vulnerable populations that suffer from pollution and other environmental harms,
it is imperative to retain environmental regulations, removing or relaxing them only
when there is a clear justification for doing so.
Built in environmental legal frameworks in both international and domestic
law is a principle of non-regression—no walking back environmental law,
regulation, or protection once put in place. Governments and institutions at all
levels ought to apply this principle in designing and implementing environmental
governance, and judges, in their role of interpreting and applying the law, ought to
incorporate the principle in their decisions and ensure the progressive realization
of rights guaranteed by environmental law.
This Article brings together a variety of expressions of the principle of nonregression in international treaties, trade agreements, declarations, and in
domestic constitutions, statutes, and administrative law—within and outside the
United States. Greater recognition of how this principle has worked in practice
may be helpful in promoting the notion that, so long as environmental degradation
continues to occur and threaten human well-being, environmental standards must
continue to move forward, and never look back.
INTRODUCTION
The covid-19 pandemic presents a grave threat to the environmental rule of
law. While the pandemic itself is not the primary cause of social inequities or
1
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Antonio Herman Benjamin for inspiring me to look into this topic, which I first saw expressed in
the jurisprudence of the National High Court of Brazil (Superior Tribunal de Justiça).
1
The International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) World Declaration on the
Environmental Rule of Law contains the following definition: “The environmental rule of law is
understood as the legal framework of procedural and substantive rights and obligations that
incorporates the principles of ecologically sustainable development in the rule of law.
Strengthening the environmental rule of law is the key to protection, conservation, and restoration
of environmental integrity. Without it, environmental governance and the enforcement of rights
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environmental crises, it has exposed and exacerbated previously existing racial,
gender, and class-based injustices.2
As the initial social and governmental response to the pandemic led to
economic paralysis in the first several months of 2020, researchers noted some
temporary reductions in the level of air pollution that coincided with the pause in
industrial activities and decrease in vehicle transportation.3 Lower air pollution
emissions make a significant difference for public health; in addition to the
estimated millions of premature deaths worldwide due to air pollution each year,
some preliminary evidence suggests that pollution contributes to a higher risk of
serious complications for patients diagnosed with covid-19.4
These reductions in pollution and consumption, however, have been
temporary, at best, and do not reflect intentional, lasting structural changes in
energy systems, industrial activity, social and economic behavior, or policy.5 The
consequences of the coronavirus and the halting, insufficient, and inconsistent
management of the public health crisis in most of the world have been devastating:
millions of illnesses, serious disabilities, and deaths from covid-19; 6 countless
negative mental health impacts; widespread loss of employment and economic
security;7 and socioeconomic upheaval.8
and obligations may be arbitrary, subjective, and unpredictable[.]” IUCN World Congress on
Environmental Law, IUCN World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law (2017),
available at
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/english_world_declaration_on_the_enviro
nmental_rule_of_law_final.pdf. The author of this article participated in the drafting committee
that prepared the declaration.
2
See, e.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality, Inequality Worsens
Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirus-inequality.html.
3
For example, in China, nitrogen oxide emissions fell sharply in March 2020. See, e.g., Jonathan
Watts & Niko Kommenda, Coronavirus Pandemic Leading to Huge Drop in Air Pollution, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 23, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/23/coronaviruspandemic-leading-to-huge-drop-in-air-pollution.
4
Alastair Lewis, What we do and don’t know about the links between air pollution and
coronavirus, THE CONVERSATION, May 12, 2020, https://theconversation.com/what-we-do-anddont-know-about-the-links-between-air-pollution-and-coronavirus-137746.
5
In April 2020, due to economic closure, daily global emissions of carbon dioxide decreased by
roughly 17% compared to 2019 averages. See Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary reduction in
daily global CO2 emissions during the COVID-19 forced confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 647 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-020-0797-x. However, the study indicates
that these reductions appears temporary, noting forecasts that emissions will rebound, as has
occurred with economic crises in the past. Id. at 647-48, 651-52.
6
Johns Hopkins University maintains data, updated daily, on the global number of diagnosed
covid-19 cases and related deaths. Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited Feb 27, 2021).
7
Kim Parker, Rachel Minkin, & Jesse Bennett, Economic Fallout From COVID-19 Continues to
Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, Pew Research Center (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-from-covid-19continues-to-hit-lower-income-americans-thehardest/#:~:text=Fully%2015%25%20of%20adults%20report,they%20are%20currently%20not%
20employed.
8
See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, They Were on Equal Footing. Then the Ground Shifted, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 27, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/business/economy/unequal-
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Furthermore, in the short to medium term, the policy response to the
coronavirus pandemic and the too-early, too-ambitious resumption of economic
activity carry with them the temptation to relax social and environmental laws and
regulations under the guise of accelerating economic recovery. In moving toward
eventual long-term management of the pandemic and a “full” reopening after
successive waves of infection, the time has never been more important to emphasize
an emerging principle of human rights law and environmental governance: the
principle of non-regression.
In the midst of deepening environmental crises—including anthropogenic
climate change,9 biodiversity loss and extinctions,10 and impacts on human health
from environmental pollution and degradation—it is imperative to retain a guiding
principle11 that, absent special circumstances, legal protection of the environment
must not be removed or reduced once it has been put in place.12 Governments and
institutions at all levels ought to apply this principle—no regression, backsliding,
or walking back environmental protection—in designing and implementing
environmental governance. Judges, in their role of interpreting and applying the
law, ought to incorporate the principle of non-regression in their decisions in order
to ensure the fulfillment of rights guaranteed by environmental law.
This principle of non-regression dovetails with the mandate toward
progressive realization of human rights.13 In jurisdictions that recognize a
economic-recovery.html (chronicling anecdotal experiences of unequal economic experiences
during the pandemic); Catarina Saraiva, How a ‘K-Shaped’ Recovery is Widening U.S. Inequality,
Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/how-a-k-shaped-recoveryis-widening-us-inequality/2020/12/10/baa6bc08-3aad-11eb-aad9-8959227280c4_story.html
(describing asymmetry between workers who have lost jobs and wealthy Americans who made
major gains in the stock market in 2020).
9
See generally Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report: Global
Warming of 1.5°C (2019), available at https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.
10
See generally Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Services (IPBES), Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity
and Ecosystem Services (2019), available at https://ipbes.net/global-assessment.
11
In this work, I generally refer to “principles” in Dworkin’s sense, distinguishing between legal
principles and legal rules. According to Dworkin, both principles and rules
point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstances,
but the differ in the character of the direction they give. Rules are applicable in
all-or-nothing fashion . . . [while principles state] a reason that argues in one
direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision. . . . [W]hen we say that a
particular principle is a principle of our law, [we mean] that the principle is one
which officials must take into account, if it is relevant, as a consideration
inclining in one direction or another.
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25-26 (1967).
12
To note, in this Article, when referring to the non-regression principle, I mean the idea that
governments and other institutions must not reduce the level of protection afforded by laws,
regulations, and standards. This is in contrast to the idea of non-degradation policies, which are
that environmental quality (or the condition of a specific ecosystem, species, or landscape) ought
not be reduced. A legal non-regression principle may support non-degradation in some areas. The
concepts are complementary, but in discussing non-regression, the focus here is on law and policy,
as opposed to a scientific or ecological measurement.
13
See infra Part I.A.
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constitutional human right to a healthy environment,14 application of the nonregression principle is one demonstration of how that right can lead to specific,
concrete outcomes in legislative, executive, and judicial decisionmaking. Of
course, principles of law are not absolute, and environmental law, policy, and rights
must coexist with other legitimate rights, guarantees, and interests. It is therefore
important to explore the limits of the non-regression principle and its relationship
with other areas and objectives in the law.
The non-regression principle I am articulating here is not merely
aspirational. International treaties, trade agreements, and declarations explicitly
include it, prohibiting backsliding in the level of environmental protection.15
Constitutions and national-level statutes require it.16 Given our ever-evolving
scientific understanding of the world and the interdependence of human life and the
ecosystems that surround us, we have greater reason to pursue stronger
environmental laws and regulations today than we did in 1992 when the Rio
Summit took place or in 1972 when the United Nations first held a major
international environmental conference.
The purpose of this Article is to bring all of these expressions of the nonregression principle in environmental law together, with the intent that greater
recognition and understanding of the concept will lead to greater respect for the
idea in global and local decisionmaking. While environmental degradation
continues to threaten quality of life and the quality of the environment for ourselves
and future generations, it is imperative, at a minimum, that environmental law move
forward as a response, rather than backward.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it sets out an introduction and
definition of non-regression in environmental law, identifying the legal foundations
for this principle in human rights law. Second, the Article discusses examples of
the principle’s application in international and comparative law: examples in which
international and domestic law constrain governments’ ability to walk back
environmental protections. Third, the Article turns to non-regression in U.S.
environmental law. Although the United States does not guarantee a constitutional
right to environmental protection, the core environmental statutes create
progressive obligations, pushing toward ever-tighter standards over time and either
prohibiting or erecting barriers against regression of those standards. These antibacksliding provisions are bolstered by administrative law doctrine that requires
reasoned decisionmaking in changing regulatory policy—doctrine that has, in
practice, established a non-regression principle. Fourth, the Article addresses
criticisms of the principle and its limits. There are practical and theoretical
limitations to the idea of non-regression, and it is important to reconcile the
principle with other important rights, theories, and legal concepts. In conclusion,
the Article returns to the present to apply the non-regression principle in the context
of economic crisis and recovery.
14

See, e.g., Nicholas S. Bryner, A Constitutional Human Right to a Healthy Environment, in
DOUGLAS FISHER (ed.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 168-95 (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).
15
See infra Part II.A-C.
16
See infra Part II.D.
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LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION

In 2016, the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s World
Commission on Environmental Law (IUCN WCEL) laid out a definition for the
principle of non-regression and its significance for the enjoyment of human rights
and for environmental protection. According to the IUCN World Declaration on
the Environmental Rule of Law, in its most simple form, the principle is that “States
. . . shall not allow or pursue actions that have the net effect of diminishing the legal
protection of the environment or of access to environmental justice.”17 Costa Rican
environmental law scholar Mario Peña Chacón offers the following explanation of
the principle:
The principle of non-regression or the prohibition of regression
affirms that environmental norms and jurisprudence ought not
change if so doing will mean backsliding with respect to the level of
protection already achieved. It is intended to avoid removing or
weakening norms in favor of interests that have not been
demonstrated to be higher in importance than the public interest in
the environment, given that, in many circumstances, backsliding can
lead to environmental consequences that are irreversible or difficult
to repair.18
This second definition suggests a connection between this principle and
concern for intergenerational equity. It also explains that the principle of nonregression is not absolute, which addresses and mitigates some criticisms of the
principle;19 it does not exist in a vacuum, but rather coexists with other
considerations, requiring proper and proportionate justification before walking
back norms or laws that affect the public’s interest in the environment.
The use of “principles”20 suggests organizing concepts that guide and
support the application of a legal discipline or legal system.21 Thus, we might speak
of fundamental principles of constitutional law in the United States, “general
principles of law” in international law,22 or the basic principles of the rule of law.23
In international environmental law, reference to principles is especially common,
17

IUCN World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law, supra note 1, prin. 12.
Mario Peña Chacón, El Principio de No Regresión Ambiental en la Legislación y
Jurisprudencia Costarricense, in Mario Peña Chacón (ed.), El Principio de No Regresión
Ambiental en el Derecho Comparado Latinoamericano 12 (U.N. Development Programme 2013)
(my translation).
19
See infra Part IV.A.
20
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 22-31.
21
See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary, Principle (11th ed. 2019) (defining principle as “[a] basic
rule, law, or doctrine; esp., one of the fundamental tenets of a system).
22
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 33 UNTS 993 (1946) (including “the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of international to apply in
disputes before the court).
23
See generally World Justice Project, What is the Rule of Law? The Four Universal Principles,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law (last visited July 11, 2020).
18
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both in soft law (dating to the Stockholm Declaration in 1972) and in major treaties,
such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.24
As a principle, the concept of non-regression has strong legal foundation in
human rights law. This connection is strongest where human rights to
environmental health and protection are guaranteed, although human rights law is
instructive, regardless of the circumstances, in explaining the importance of the
principle of non-regression and how it can apply in practice.
A. Progressive Realization of Human Rights
Since the beginning of the human rights era in the mid-20th century and the
creation of the United Nations system of international cooperation and governance,
international law has consistently included an obligation for each State to undertake
the “progressive realization” of human rights. In the preamble to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General Assembly proclaimed that “all
peoples and all nations” shall take “progressive measures, national and
international, to secure [the] universal and effective recognition and observance”
of human rights.25
Later, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
ratified the concept, requiring each Party to the Covenant “to take steps,
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization” of human rights.26 In the InterAmerican system, the American Convention on Human Rights, signed in San José,
Costa Rica, in 1969, requires State Parties “to adopt measures, both internally and
through international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical
nature, with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate
means, the full realization” of human rights.27
The concept of progressive realization in the major human rights covenants
differentiates between those state obligations in recognizing human rights that are
immediate and other rights—rights that states also have binding obligations to
guarantee, but that may not be fully realized immediately. Despite this difference,
human rights law still requires states to make immediate and continuous efforts,
taking steps and dedicating resources toward the realization of those rights,
recognizing that the implementation of these measures may take time.
The idea of progressive realization for some categories of rights is
contentious: it can be used as an excuse for slow progress in guaranteeing
24

Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, in Report of the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972) (including a list of 26 principles “for
the preservation and improvement of the human environment”); United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (1994) (listing principles
that parties to the Convention “shall be guided” by “[i]n their actions to achieve the objective of
the Convention and to implement its provisions”).
25
U.N.G.A., Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948 (emphasis added).
26
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, para. 1
(emphasis added).
27
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 26.
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economic, social, and cultural rights. However, the progressive nature of these
obligations means that, once norms and laws have been put in place to secure the
right, the State now has the duty to maintain the enjoyment of the right. According
to Peña Chacón, it is in this sense that the principle of non-regression is the “other
side” of progressive realization.28
B. Human Rights and Environmental Protection
In the past several decades, jurists in various parts of the world have pointed
to the link between, or rather, the interdependence of environmental protection and
human rights, in two ways. This interrelationship between environmental health
and human rights in general is described by the first UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox: “Environmental harm interferes
with the enjoyment of human rights, and the exercise of human rights helps to
protect the environment and to promote sustainable development.”29
First, because the environment—air, water, soil, and the biosphere—is
necessary for and supports human life, damage to the environment implicates
fundamental rights that include the right to life and rights to health and safety.30
Humans, individually and collectively, therefore have the right to the continued
maintenance of the ecosystem services that support life.31 Indeed, many of the
judicial decisions around the world that connect the environment and human rights
are rooted in the right to life and the duty of governments to protect the life of their
citizens.32
Second, the full enjoyment of human rights supports environmental
protection. Procedural rights and participatory rights, including the right to access
to information, to public participation in decisionmaking, and effective access to
justice33 all serve as an important barrier to prevent many activities that would cause
environmental damage. These rights, though they may be categorized as civil and
political rights,34 have a profound impact on the environment and on economic,
social, and cultural rights by providing effective checks on government action.
28

Peña Chacón, supra note 18, at 16.
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment,
UN Docs. A/HRC/37/59, Annex (2018), para. 1.
30
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6.1 (“Every human being has
the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.”)
31
UN Human Rights Council, supra note 29.
32
See generally DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH L. SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 436-544 (2012) (discussing and excerpting cases from domestic courts and
international human rights courts or bodies involving substantive human rights and the
environment).
33
Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, June 14, 1992, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1, annex I, prin. 10.
34
Various portions of the ICCPR address issues of due process, rights to public participation, and
access to information. See ICCPR, supra note 30, arts. 14 (equality before tribunals), 16 (right to
recognition as a person), 19 (freedom of expression), 25 (participation in the conduct of public
affairs). Regional treaties in Europe and Latin America specifically address the application of
29
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Building on and concurrent with these forays into the connection between
human rights and the environment, the recognition of a human right to a clean and
healthy environment has more clearly established this interdependence. The
majority of national constitutions now in place in the world establish such a right,
including nearly every constitution written or substantially revised since the
1970s.35 In particular, many Latin American countries have led the way with clearly
conveyed environmental rights. Bolivia’s Constitution of 2009, for example,
provides:
Article 33. Everyone has the right to a healthy, protected, and
balanced environment. The exercise of this right must be granted to
individuals and collectives of present and future generations, as well
as to other living things, so they may develop in a normal and
permanent way.
Article 34. Any person, in his or her own right or on behalf of a
collective, is authorized to take legal action in defense of
environmental rights, without prejudice to the obligation of public
institutions to act on their own in the face of attacks on the
environment.36
The Inter-American human rights system also recognizes a right to a healthy
environment. Article 11 of the San Salvador Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights provides: “Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy
environment and to have access to basic public services. The States Parties shall
promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment.”37
Paired with the substantive right to a minimum level of environmental
quality and health is the State’s obligation to guarantee that right. The right to a
healthy environment or an ecologically balanced environment is a human right,
whether with individuals, communities, or entire nations as rightsholders.38 Yet
these “Rio Principle 10” rights with regard to environmental matters. See Aarhus Convention
(Europe); Escazú Agreement (Latin America).
35
See, e.g., Nicholas S. Bryner, A constitutional human right to a healthy environment, in
DOUGLAS FISHER (ed.), RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 168-95 (Edward Elgar 2016).
36
Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, arts. 33-34 (2009), available at
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf (English trans. Constitute
Project).
37
Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (San Salvador), Nov. 17, 1988, OAS
Treaty Series No. 69. The Parties to the Protocol as of 2020 are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay. See Organization of American States Department of
International Law, Signatories and Ratifications, https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a52.html (last visited July 16, 2020).
38
Some jurisdictions in the world, led most prominently by Ecuador, now recognize “rights of
nature,” centered not on humans but on other life and natural objects as the subjects meriting legal
protection. See Constitución de la República del Ecuador arts. 71-74 (2008). Ecuador’s courts
have begun, in the past few years, to take on cases involving rights of nature claims, creating a
fuller picture of how rights of nature work in practice. See, e.g., Hugo Echeverría, Rights of
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although this right is anthropocentric, enjoyed by and defined by humans, the
accompanying duty of progressive realization, applied in this context, necessarily
extends to the condition—the health, integrity, and sustainability—of the
environment.
Because there can be no right to a healthy environment without the
protection of that environment, if the state bears the duty of progressive realization
of this right, there must necessarily be an obligation to progressively enhance
environmental protection and prevent activities that may cause environmental
damage. In other words, when a government takes action to assure the human right
to a healthy environment, human rights law requires continuing to advance toward
full enjoyment of that right—and the principle of non-regression prohibits any
backtracking in this regard. Any action that results in a reduction of legal protection
for ecosystems, biodiversity, air and water quality, or other component of the
environment, negatively impacts the right to a healthy environment, and by so
doing, violates the principles of progressive realization and non-regression.
This human rights-based justification is a clear legal foundation for the
principle of non-regression in environmental matters in any jurisdiction where a
human right to environmental quality is recognized. In these places, there is no
debate; non-regression is a fundamental concept underpinning the legal system—
one that must be applied together with other basic principles and concepts.
Notwithstanding, recognizing environmental rights, while a sufficient justification
to apply non-regression, need not necessarily be the only justification that supports
the principle. The rule of law generally permits the revocation of laws: what a
legislature enacts, it may repeal by the same procedure. However, as will be
discussed further below, non-regression may be applied to administrative or
executive-branch decisionmaking by statute; in the environmental context, basic
principles about how decisionmaking processes work will yield this result in
practice.
II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW

Setting aside the theory and legal foundation for the principle of nonregression, analysis of some examples illustrates the principle’s development and
application in practice. As with any other legal principle, the principle of nonregression does not exist in a vacuum. It coexists and correlates with other values,
precepts, and commitments. At the international level as well as in national-level
constitutions, statutes, and jurisprudence, examples of the non-regression principle
help provide the content and contours of the requirement to not walk back
environmental rules.
A. Non-Regression in Investment and Free Trade Agreements

Nature: The Ecuadorian Case, 9 REVISTA DA ESCOLA SUPERIOR DA MAGISTRATURA
TOCANTINENSE 77 (2017), available at
http://esmat.tjto.jus.br/publicacoes/index.php/revista_esmat/article/view/192.
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First, at the international level, the use of the non-regression principle is
common in free trade agreements and investment treaties.39 Andrew Mitchell and
James Munro’s study in 2019 found 130 countries in the world with at least one
investment treaty that contained a non-regression provision with regard to
environmental protection.40 In these types of provisions, parties to the treaties agree
not to roll back environmental regulations (and other regulatory standards related
to labor laws, health and safety requirements, etc.) in order to promote foreign
investment in the country.
At the regional level, free trade agreements include similar language. From
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was in effect from
1994 to 2020:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental
measures. Accordingly, a Party should not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such
measures as an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition,
expansion or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor.
If a Party considers that another Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party
and the two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement.41
The new trilateral U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) entered into force in
July 2020 and maintains similar language: “[A] Party shall not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws
in a manner that weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order
to encourage trade or investment between the Parties.”42
These international, regional, and bilateral agreements have in common the
norm—the basic principle—that countries should not roll back environmental
protections that have already been put in place in order to attract investment. This
is environmental non-regression in practice. Non-regression in the investment and
trade context is not based on environmental rights or other human rights, but rather
on the necessities of effective cross-jurisdictional cooperation.
The rationale for this type of cooperation is familiar in the history of
environmental federalism in the United States. Prior to the advent of the major
federal environmental statutes in the 1970s, some states had begun enacting
restrictions on sources of air and water pollution and other environmental threats.
One of the motivating needs for federal legislation was to avoid a “race to the
bottom” in which other states, eager to attract investment or business, would
39

Andrew D. Mitchell & James Munro, No Retreat: An Emerging Principle of Non-Regression
From Environmental Protections in International Investment Law, 50 GEO J. INT’L L. 625 (2019).
40
Id.
41
North American Free Trade Agreement (Canada, Mexico, and the United States), Dec. 17, 1992
(entry into force Jan. 1, 1994), art. 1114, para. 2.
42
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Dec. 13, 2019 (entry into force July 1,
2020), art. 24.4, para. 3. The USMCA superseded the earlier agreement, NAFTA.
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undermine environmental protection efforts by adopting weaker standards—
effectively subsidizing polluting activities by failing to impose regulatory costs
concomitant with the social costs of pollution.43
Of course, despite the application of non-regression provisions, other
common norms and principles in investment and trade agreements do not point
toward greater environmental protection. Under the GATT and now the WTO,
international rules restrict the use of non-tariff trade barriers and require equal
treatment for “like” products—generally without regard to the regulation of the
differences in environmental impacts across countries.44 Article XX of the GATT,
on its face, authorizes countries to impose environmental regulations that may have
an impact on trade.45 However, major examples, such as the conflicts over the
import restrictions of tuna (due to impacts on dolphins) and shrimp (due to turtle
bycatch) illustrate that free trade compliance systems exhibit a strong bias against
the establishment of new environmental regulations, with a high bar to meet the
GATT and WTO exemptions for environmental non-tariff trade barriers.46
Environmental criticism of regional and global trade agreements is
widespread, and few would argue that free trade and investment treaties are “proenvironment” in their drafting or in their impact. It is precisely in this context that
it is relevant to note—despite other norms in trade law that cut against
environmental protection—the widespread prevalence of the principle of nonregression. In other to maintain cooperation, once environmental standards are
set—with the rights-based obligation to progressively advance these standards—
most countries have committed to at least some form of the idea that they cannot
be rolled back simply to gain economic advantage.
B. Examples in Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Negotiators in multilateral settings have pushed for the enactment of nonregression provisions in binding environmental treaties and conventions (as well as
“soft law” environmental declarations, discussed in the following section). The
non-regression principle in international environmental law is based on two ideas,
43

See Robert L. Glicksman & Jessica Wentz, Debunking Revisions Understandings of
Environmental Cooperative Federalism: Collective Action Responses to Air Pollution, in Kalyani
Robbins & Erin Ryan (eds.), The Law and Policy of Environmental Federalism: A Comparative
Analysis (Edward Elgar 2015) (discussing the “race to the bottom” problem the history of the
Clean Air Act as a response).
44
General Agreement on Trade & Tariffs, art. I, para. 1 (1947) (“[A]ny advantage, favour,
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories for all other contracting parties.”).
45
GATT, art. XX(g).
46
See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT, DS21/R –
39S/155 (1991), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/gatt_e/91tuna.pdf
(Mexico’s claim against the United States based on U.S. imposed “dolphin-safe” tuna
restrictions); World Trade Organization, Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R (1998), available at
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58r00.pdf (claim by several countries against the
United States for restrictions on shrimp requiring devices to protect sea turtles).
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both described earlier. First, under the human rights principle of progressive
realization, international environmental law pushes toward ever-greater respect for
environmental rights in addressing issues of transboundary or global concern (e.g.,
transboundary air and water pollution, biodiversity loss, ozone depletion, and
climate change).47 Second, international environmental law principles are intended
to avoid the “race to the bottom” described above and to avoid “free riding” among
countries that might employ lesser measures but share in the benefits of collective
action with regard to the environment.48
1. Washington Convention
Perhaps the earliest applied example of the non-regression principle in
international environmental law dates to the little-known Convention on Nature
Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere. 49 Signed in
Washington, DC, in 1940, the Convention protects flora and fauna “in their natural
habitat . . . in sufficient numbers and over areas extensive enough to assure them
from becoming extinct” and “protect[s] and preserve[s] scenery of extraordinary
beauty, unusual and striking geologic formations, regions and natural objects of
aesthetic, historic or scientific value, and areas characterized by primitive
conditions . . . .”50
Article II of the Convention addresses the establishment of “national parks,
national reserves, nature monuments, and strict wilderness reserves” in each
country.51 Once countries have set apart these protected areas, Article III of the
Convention employs the non-regression principle: “The Contracting Governments
agree that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered, or any portion
thereof be capable of alienation except by the competent legislative authority.”52
The non-regression obligation here is narrow; it does not, by its terms, prohibit
legislative action to revoke the creation of national parks or other protected areas.
However, it reflects a commitment by the 19 parties to the Convention that the
setting aside of areas for environmental protection ought to be permanent.53 Actions
by presidents or other executive officials to weaken those protections are
47

For example, the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework on Climate Change is discussed
infra, requiring increased ambition in each round of nationally set climate mitigation targets.
48
See, e.g., Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, Free-riding in international
environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties, 23 J. THEORETICAL
POL. 111 (2011) (analyzing a model for international environmental negotiation and concluding
that free-riding incentives can inhibit countries from joining environmental agreements).
49
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,
Washington, DC, Oct. 12, 1940, OAS Treaty Series No. C-8, available at
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/c-8.html.
50
Id. Preamble.
51
These terms are defined in Article I of the Convention as different classifications of protected
areas. Id. arts I, II.
52
Id. art. III.
53
The Organization of American States maintains the list of signatories and ratifications to the
Convention. OAS Department of International Law, Signatories and Ratifications, C-8:
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/c-8.html (last visited July 20, 2020).
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illegitimate under the Convention; only the legislature, which represents a more
deliberative process—which should be less swayed by the prospect for short-term
political or economic gain—may act to reconsider, roll back, or downsize the
environmental commitment to preserving wildlife, scenery, and other valuable
public resources.
2. Escazú Agreement
The economic region of Latin America and the Caribbean has recently
formed an agreement on the rights of participation in environmental matters: the
right of the public to participate in decisionmaking, the right to access to
information, and the right to effective access to justice.54 Built on a negotiating
platform established at the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development in
2012, the Escazú Agreement is a treaty focused on both environmental protection
and on human rights.55
The Escazú Agreement advances the principle of non-regression as a
binding commitment in international environmental and human rights law.56 Article
3 of the Agreement lists basic principles of international law and environmental
law that guide its implementation—both in the interpretation of the Agreement’s
terms and in its application to each State.57 Among these are the “Principle of nonregression and principle of progressive realization.”58 The Agreement further
requires States to generate and disseminate environmental information and, in so
doing, provides that “[e]ach Party shall guarantee that environmental information
systems are duly organized, accessible to all persons and made progressively
available . . . .”59
The direct mention of the non-regression principle in the Escazú Agreement
is an important milestone for the recognition and scope of the principle. The
Agreement is the first binding multilateral treaty to explicitly incorporate nonregression in an environmental context. It also means that the principle is not
54

Regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean [Escazú Agreement], Mar. 4, 2018,
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2018/03/20180312%2003-04%20PM/CTCXXVII-18.pdf.
55
At the Rio+20 conference, Latin American countries committed to open a process toward a
binding treaty to guarantee the “access rights” laid out in Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development. See UN Conference on Sustainable Development, Declaration
on the Application of Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, July
25, 2012, UN Doc A/Conf.216/13, available at
https://www.cepal.org/rio20/noticias/paginas/8/48588/Declaracion-eng-N1244043.pdf.
56
The Escazú Agreement required 11 ratifications among signatory nations in order for the treaty
to enter into force. Escazú Agreement, supra note 54, art. 22. On January 22, 2021, Argentina and
Mexico deposited their ratification instruments, becoming the 11 th and 12th countries to do so. As
such, the treaty enters into force as of April 2021. See ECLAC Celebrates Prompt Entry into
Force of the Escazú Agreement and Highlights the Region’s Commitment to Sustainable
Development and Human Rights, https://www.cepal.org/en/news/eclac-celebrates-prompt-entryforce-escazu-agreement-and-highlights-regions-commitment (Jan. 22, 2021).
57
Escazú Agreement, supra note 54, art. 3.
58
Id. art. 3(c).
59
Id. art 6, para. 3 (emphasis added).
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limited to the regulation of certain biomes or protected areas or to one type of state
action. Rather, the Agreement requires parties to take appropriate measures to
guarantee the full enjoyment of access rights throughout the scope of the
government’s authority, from administrative decisionmaking to judicial systems.
To secure these rights is the treaty’s positive obligation of progressive
realization, and by applying the principle of non-regression, the treaty requires
parties to maintain these measures and keep them in place, with no backsliding.60
For example, under the Agreement, if a country has established by law or policy a
system for public participation and consultation prior to the construction of
infrastructure or other developments that may cause environmental damage, the
State cannot exempt a project from the established procedural requirements in the
face of political or economic pressure. Once the obligation is in place, derogation
from it violates the principle of non-regression.

3. Paris Agreement
International negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change have had a turbulent history since the Convention was signed in 1992. Early
success in the 1990s led to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 that placed
binding targets on greenhouse gas emissions for the first time, focused on
developed countries and “economies in transition” in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union.61 Although the Kyoto Protocol eventually did enter into force
a decade later when it was ratified by Russia,62 opposition by the United States,63
in particular, led to a move away from a uniform system of quantitative emission
reduction targets set by the UNFCCC parties as a whole.
In the lead-up to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in
December 2009, negotiators from Europe and other parts of the world had hoped
to put in place a second round of targets, with deeper emissions cuts and the
inclusion of a greater number of countries. By the time of the conference, however,

60

Escazú Agreement, supra note 54, art. 3(c).
Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2303 UNTS 162 (1997).
The lists of applicable countries and their numeric targets for the period of 2008-2012 were listed
in Annex B to the Protocol. See id., 2303 UNTS at 233-234, Annex B.
62
Per Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, it entered into force 90 days following the ratification of at
least 55 Parties representing at least 55% of the global total CO 2 emissions in 1990 among the
countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC. Id. art. 25. This threshold was met when the Russian
Federation ratified the Protocol in November 2004; the Protocol therefore entered into force in
2005. See UNFCCC, Russian Federation, https://unfccc.int/node/61150 (last visited Sept. 8, 2020)
(listing the Russian Federation’s signature and ratification dates).
63
In the U.S. Senate, for example, the Byrd-Hagel resolution expressed “the sense of the Senate”
in opposition to the terms of what would become the Kyoto Protocol as it was being developed;
the resolution passed unanimously, 95-0. S. Res. 98 (105th Cong.) (1997) [commonly known as
the “Byrd-Hagel” Resolution]. The Senate never took any vote as to the ratification of the
Protocol.
61
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the Kyoto-style agreement had broken apart when the United States, China, and
other major emitters balked at the inclusion of a new round of top-down targets.64
Instead, coming out of the 2009 meeting was the short Copenhagen Accord
(negotiated at the last moments of the conference by a room full of world leaders,
including President Obama), which employed what has been termed a “pledge and
review” model of international climate target commitments.65 Rather than having a
centrally-defined set of targets for all countries decided by the treaty body and
negotiators, individual countries make their own pledges that become mutually
reaffirming with pledges made by other parties to the convention.66 Periodically,
countries review their commitments and make revised rounds of pledges.67
Climate advocates expressed considerable disappointment and skepticism
about the Copenhagen Accord, as there is no international authority for assessing
the sufficiency of any country pledges, and no accountability mechanism for the
strength of the pledges other than a sort of international “naming and shaming.”68
In the years that followed Copenhagen, momentum eventually built toward
negotiating a new agreement that would govern international climate commitments
beyond 2020. In November 2014, China and the United States boosted hopes for a
globally-encompassing accord when they announced a bilateral agreement under
which the United States would cut GHG emissions by 26-28% below 2005 levels
by 2025 and China would peak its national emissions no later than 2030, with cuts
to follow.69
This joint announcement formed the two countries’ negotiating positions
and plans for the 2015 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Paris.70 Based on this
and extensive negotiating efforts around the world, the 2015 Conference resulted
in the near-universal adoption of the Paris Agreement.71 The Paris Agreement
follows the pledge and review process, but takes the form of a binding agreement
in which each individual country develops its own “nationally determined
contributions”72 of measures and actions toward “achieving the purpose of the
Agreement”: limiting climate change to 2°C, or ideally to 1.5°C above preindustrial global surface temperatures.73

64

See, e.g., David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate
Governance, Sust. Dev. L & Pol’y 4, 4-6 (Spring 2010) (discussing the setbacks in the “road to
Copenhagen”).
65
UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.15 [Copenhagen Accord] (2009). The Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC decided simply to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, rather than formally adopting
it, reflecting division and disappointment among the parties at the outcome of the meeting. Id.
66
Id., paras. 4-5. The Accord calls for targets to be listed in an Appendix, which appeared simply
as an empty table following the text as reported by the Conference of the Parties, to be filled by
countries on their own terms.
67
The Accord called for “an assessment” of its implementation by 2015. Id. para 12.
68
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 64, at 4.
69
See The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on
Climate Change, Nov. 11, 2014.
70
See id.
71
Paris Agreement to the UNFCCC (2015).
72
Id. art.4.
73
Id. art. 2.
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Although the Paris Agreement is subject to some of the same criticisms as
the earlier Copenhagen Accord, the non-regression principle and companion
principle of progressivity are expressed throughout its text. Early on, before specific
obligations are listed, Article 3 of the Paris Agreement states that “[t]he efforts of
all Parties will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need to
support the developing country Parties for the effective implementation of this
Agreement.” Article 4 describes the main obligation of nationally determined
contributions (NDCs) in greater substance and detail. Paragraph 3 of that article
provides:
Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will
represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally
determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition,
reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, in the light of different national
circumstances.74
As each round of a country’s NDC must represent a progression beyond
previous commitments, the Paris Agreement therefore is a non-regression treaty; it
prohibits backsliding or rolling back, so long as the country continues to
participate.75
C. Environmental Non-Regression in Soft Law
In the broader field of international environmental law, the principle of nonregression has been emphasized in soft law, in global declarations and accords,
particularly in the last decade. In negotiations that have led to the development of
new environmental agreements, the principle is there, repeated as a reflection of
state custom in international environmental law.
As one prominent example, in the final outcome document from the Rio+20
Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012, entitled “The Future We Want,”
the UN General Assembly addressed the concept, although not as directly as some
environmental civil society organizations and national-level negotiators had
wanted.76 The result, in paragraph 20 of the document, is an
74

Id. art 4.3.
Note, of course, that the Paris Agreement does allow countries to walk back their climate
commitment by withdrawing from the Agreement altogether. See id. art. 28. On November 4,
2019, the Trump Administration communicated to the UNFCCC the United States’ intent to
withdraw, which took effect on November 4, 2020, as per the one-year minimum timeframe in
Article 28. See Press Statement, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, Michael R.
Pompeo, Secretary of State (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-fromthe-paris-agreement/. Two months later, on January 20, 2021, only hours after the inauguration of
President Joe Biden, the new President signed a one-paragraph instrument re-accepting the Paris
Agreement. The White House, Paris Climate Agreement, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/ (accessed Feb. 11, 2021).
76
See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Non-regression in Environmental Law, 5(2) SAPIENS (2012),
https://journals.openedition.org/sapiens/1405. Prieur describes the history of the provision leading
up to the Rio+20 conference. The French government proposed inclusion of the principle in its
75
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acknowledg[ment] that, since 1992, there have been areas of
insufficient progress and setbacks in the integration of the three
dimensions of sustainable development, aggravated by multiple
financial, economic, food and energy crises, which have threatened
the ability of all countries, in particular developing countries, to
achieve sustainable development. In this regard, it is critical that we
do not backtrack from our commitment to the outcome of the [Rio
Earth Summit of 1992]. We also recognize that one of the current
major challenges for all countries, particularly for developing
countries, is the impact from the multiple crises affecting the world
today.77
Some countries had wanted a clearer declaration against regression of
environmental standards, but faced opposition from the United States, Japan,
Canada, and others, in favor of the “do not backtrack” language that eventually was
added to the final document.78 Notably, the declaration, while not binding, refers to
the complexity of applying the principle of non-regression in the face of “multiple
crises” among many other challenges to achieving sustainable development. As
such, it is a recognition that political and economic pressure to roll back
environmental protection and the enjoyment of environmental rights can be quite
common; balancing the application of the principle of non-regression with other
relevant legal principles and interests is critical in assessing whether any
“regression” may be justifiable, rational, and proportionate under these
circumstances.79
D. Examples in Domestic Law
At the national level in many countries, the non-regression principle in
environmental law is enshrined in constitutions, statutes, administrative
procedures, and in judicial decisions. Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Mexico present
contrasting examples—all of which differ significantly from non-regression in the
United States—about how law and decisionmaking can reflect a commitment to the
non-regression principle.
1. Ecuador
The Constitution of Ecuador is a reference point for the potential to weave
the principle of non-regression throughout national law. In the Constitution of
recommendations for the conference, and the expression “principle of non-regression” was
proposed by the Group of 77 + China during informal negotiations. After it was removed, it was
replaced with the language in paragraph 20. See id. at paras. 13, 14.
77
The Future We Want, para. 20, July 27, 2012, UN Doc. A/Res./66/288 (emphasis added).
78
See Prieur, supra note 76.
79
See discussion infra in Part V on the principle of non-regression in the context of economic
crisis during and after the covid-19 pandemic.
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2008—known internationally for its recognition of the rights of nature80—Ecuador
adopted an exhaustive set of constitutional norms regarding the content of a human
right to the environment as well as procedural rights and interpretive principles that
support the implementation and progressive enjoyment of environmental rights.81
Article 11 of the constitution governs the exercise of constitutional rights,
laying out, among other principles, the idea that “any action or omission of a
regressive nature that unjustifiably diminishes, limits, or annuls the exercise of
rights shall be unconstitutional.”82 As environmental rights are spread throughout
the constitutional text, this general principle applies in any circumstance in which
executive or legislative powers in the country act to reduce environmental
protection.
2. Costa Rica
In Costa Rica, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber (Sala
Constitucional) has incorporated the principle of non-regression in its interpretation
of the country’s constitutional human right to a healthy and ecologically balanced
environment.83 Scholarship on non-regression from Dr. Peña Chacón and Dr. Edgar
Fernández includes analysis of the leading cases.84
One prominent case began in 1996, when the country’s updated Forest Act
(Ley Forestal) provided for a reduction in the size of a protected area.85 The
Constitutional Chamber struck down the specific provision of the Act as
unconstitutional, inconsistent with the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced
environment.86 The court explained that the principle of non-regression applies to
the enjoyment of this right, and given the legal hierarchy that places the
Constitution as supreme over ordinary legislation, the legislature’s attempt to
shrink the protected area must fall. Notwithstanding the result, the court clarified
that the principle of non-regression is not absolute and not automatic; the court
explicitly rejected the idea that every move to undo environmental protections
would be unconstitutional. Rather, before revoking or reducing environmental
requirements, proper justification and adequate deliberation must be shown. The
court noted in its opinion:

80

Constitución de la República del Ecuador arts. 71-74 (2008). See supra note 38.
In particular, see Constitución de la República del Ecuador arts. 14, 32, 55, 66, 71-74, 395-407.
82
Id. art. 11 (my translation).
83
Constitution of Costa Rica, art. 50.
84
In 2013, the UN Development Programme published a book on comparative application of the
principle of non-regression in environmental law in Latin America, edited by Dr. Peña Chacón.
The book includes several chapters on Costa Rica. See MARIO PEÑA CHACÓN (ed.), EL PRINCIPIO
DE NO REGRESIÓN AMBIENTAL EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO LATINOAMERICANO (UN
Development Programme 2013).
85
Ley Forestal No. 7575 del 13 de febrero de 1996 (Costa Rica), Artículo 71. The case is
described in Edgar Fernández Fernández, Reflexiones Sobre el Principio de “No Regresión
Ambiental” en el Derecho Costarricense, in Peña Chacón, supra note 84, at 89-107.
86
Sala Constitucional, Voto No. 7294-98 de las 16:15 horas del 13 de octubre de 1998 (cited in
Fernández, supra note 85, at 91.
81
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To reduce the size of any wild protected area, the Legislative
Assembly must do so based on sufficient technical studies necessary
to determine that such action will not cause harm to or endanger the
environment, and therefore, will not jeopardize the [constitutional
right to a healthy environment].87
This description of the non-regression principle in environmental law
envisions that the appropriate decisionmakers, with proper scientific basis, might
conclude that relaxing legal standards will not threaten the environment. It properly
roots the non-regression principle in the idea of preventing harm to the
environment, as opposed to simply preventing changes in the law.
Applying the principle of non-regression does not elevate prior decisions or
actions, making them immutable. Instead, as the Costa Rican court understood, the
principle is in place to avoid changes that are unjustifiable. Based on new
information, scientific studies might conclude, for example, that a legal restriction
has been successful and run its course (making it no longer necessary),88 or that the
law created unintended side effects that undermined its effectiveness as an
environmental measure.89 In other words, Costa Rica’s constitutional right to a
healthy environment, together with the principle of non-regression, prohibits
regressive legislative action unless it is rational and adequately justified so as to
guarantee continued environmental protection and enjoyment of the right.
III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION IN THE UNITED STATES

Environmental law in the United States provides a contrast to the examples
from Latin America. In the United States, of course, there is no federal
constitutional provision addressing the environment or environmental concerns,
despite several attempts to include an environmental amendment since the 1970s.90
Several state constitutions include environmental rights and related guarantees,

87

Id. at [ ].
A common and concrete example of this is the removal of protections for an endangered species
that has recovered to the point where regulation is no longer necessary. In the United States, the
text of the Endangered Species Act provides for this, and several decades of practice show how
the process has been implemented. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (on the development of “recovery plans”);
see also U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Delisting a Species: Section 4 of the Endangered Species
Act (2002), available at
https://www.fws.gov/pacific/ecoservices/endangered/classification/pdf/delisting.pdf (outlining the
steps in the Service’s process for determining whether to delist an endangered or threatened
species). Delisting a species may be a “regression” in protection but would not violate the
principle of non-regression when justified by scientific data.
89
The movement toward “adaptive management” in natural resources policy includes the idea that
some regulation ought to be flexible, allowing for iterative analysis and revisiting to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of natural resources management. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig &
J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014).
90
See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, The Case for an Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States for Protection of the Environment, 1 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 2 (1991) (noting
proposals in the House of Representatives in 1967 and 1968 and in the Senate in 1970, as well as
subsequent amendment ideas).
88
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such as public trust provisions on natural resources or specific ecosystems;91
however, at the federal level, the Constitution remains silent.
Lack of a federal constitutional provision on environmental rights does not
eliminate the application of the non-regression principle in environmental law. It
does mean, though, that there is no broadly based right for courts to cite to (as is
the case in Ecuador or Costa Rica) as a constitutional mandate that would invalidate
regressive actions. Instead, to put it in practice, a court or other decisionmaking
body in the United States must find support for the principle in statutes, regulations,
or other legal authority.
Federal law either prohibits or discourages regression in environmental
protection in two key ways. First, substantive environmental statutes and
implementing regulations include anti-backsliding provisions in the granting of
environmental permits.92 Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires
rationality in agency decisionmaking, which provides a significant check on agency
efforts to undo or revoke environmental protections.93
A. Non-Regression in U.S. Environmental Statutes
Congress has written the non-regression principle into specific provisions
throughout the environmental law canon. Highlighted here are examples from
programs in the Clean Water Act and Clean Water Act, two of the core statutes for
pollution control in the United States.
1. Anti-Backsliding in the Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act’s permitting program contains an often-cited example
of statutory non-regression mandates.94 Under Sections 301 and 402 of the Act, any
person that discharges a pollutant into “waters of the United States” (essentially,
water subject to the Act’s jurisdiction) must obtain a permit from the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).95
Section 402 creates the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) for granting and reviewing permits for pollution discharges.96 Under the
91

See, e.g., James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State Constitutions,
in JAMES R. MAY (ed.), PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 315-21
(ABA 2011) (listing state constitutional provisions on environmental and natural resources topics
from 23 states and U.S. territories).
92
Examples from the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—two of the most complex regulatory
statutes in the United States—are included below.
93
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing the relevant standards for courts to set aside administrative
agency action);
94
See, e.g., Melissa A. Thorne, Antibacksliding: Understanding One of the Most Misunderstood
Provisions of the Clean Water Act, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10322 (2001).
95
Clean Water Act §§ 301, 402 [33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342]. Section 301(a) provides that “[e]xcept
as in compliance with this section and [various other sections of the Clean Water Act], the
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 502 of
the Act provides definitions and scope for these terms, including a broad definition of “pollutant.”
33 U.S.C. § 1362.
96
33 U.S.C. § 1342.
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Act, either the EPA or state environmental protection agencies that have delegated
authority from the EPA establish limits based on technology standards indicated by
the Act that are written into a regulated party’s permit. For example, a facility may
have a permit that authorizes discharges only to a maximum quantity of a pollutant
per day or to a maximum concentration or temperature.
At least every 5 years, the EPA or relevant state agency must review (and
reissue, if appropriate) each NPDES permit.97 When doing so, the Clean Water Act
prohibits any “backsliding” in the permit:98 “a permit may not be renewed, reissued,
or modified . . . to contain effluent limitations which are less stringent than the
comparable effluent limitations in the previous permit.”99 Unless an exception in
the statute applies, once an obligation to limit pollution to certain level has been
applied, a regulated facility cannot negotiate a looser standard when it comes time
to renew the permit.100 The permit limit may be tightened, in other words, but no
backsliding is allowed.
2. Clean Air Act Non-Regression: NAAQS
The Clean Air Act also employs non-regression concepts in regulating
regional ambient air quality and in controlling pollutant emissions from motor
vehicles. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) for several major pollutants,101 and state authorities develop
plans and impose restrictions either to work toward the attainment of the NAAQS
or to maintain current air quality if it is already adequate.102 The EPA conducts a
“complete and thorough review” of the NAAQS for each pollutant every five years,
based on updated scientific data, to continue to provide standards that adequately
protect human health and the environment.103
While the EPA may relax the NAAQS for a pollutant, this is rare; in a half
century of Clean Air Act implementation, the trend has been toward more stringent
NAAQS as atmospheric scientists and public health experts come to a better
understanding of the impacts of air pollution. When the EPA does decide to loosen
a NAAQS, Congress applied the non-regression principle in the Clean Air Act: the
EPA must put in place “anti-backsliding measures for all areas that have not
attained that standard as of the date of the relaxation.”104 These measures “shall
provide for controls which are not less stringent than the controls applicable to areas
designated nonattainment before such relaxation.”105

97

Id. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 1342(o). This anti-backsliding mandate was first put in place by EPA regulation, and was
formally added to the statute by Congress in 1987. See Thorne, supra note 94, at 10323.
99
33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1).
100
Id. § 1342(o)(2).
101
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409.
102
Id. § 7410 (on the formation of “state implementation plans” for meeting the NAAQS).
103
Id. § 7409(d)(1).
104
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. EPA, 882 F.3d 1138, 1145 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2018)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(e)).
105
42 U.S.C. § 7502(e).
98
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The type of situation in which this anti-backsliding requirement comes into
play is complex and technical but illustrates the degree and extent to which
Congress followed the principle of non-regression in developing the Clean Air Act.
As a recent example, in 2018, the D.C. Circuit applied the anti-backsliding
provisions and invalidated some of the actions EPA had taken in implementing the
NAAQS for ground-level ozone.106 In 2008, EPA had updated the ozone NAAQS
with a (generally) tighter standard than had previously been promulgated in the
1997 ozone NAAQS.107 However, because the 1997 standard had measured peak
pollutant concentrations over a 1-hour period rather than taking the average over
an 8-hour period in the 2008 standard, there were some areas out of attainment with
the 1997 standard (with higher, but shorter peaks in pollution levels) that were then
“in” attainment with the tighter 2008 standard.108
At the time, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, EPA retained the restrictions that
had been put in place for these areas under the 1997 standard so as to prevent any
regression.109 When EPA removed these restrictions in 2015, the DC Circuit found
a statutory violation because EPA could not relax these restrictions without a
finding that the areas in question had actually reached attainment with the original
1997 standard.110
3. Clean Air Act Non-Regression: Motor Vehicles
Title II of the Clean Air Act begins with a simple provision, committing
decisionmaking authority to the EPA about what air pollutants to regulate from
motor vehicle tailpipes and how to regulate them. Section 202(a) calls on the EPA
to
prescribe (and from time to time revise) . . . standards applicable to
the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in [the
Administrator’s] judgment cause, or contribute, to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.111
This section dates originally to 1965—prior to the creation of the EPA and to the
establishment of most of the familiar Clean Air Act programs that regulate

106

South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1143.
73 FED. REG. 16,346 (Mar. 27, 2008) (setting a maximum standard of 75 parts per billion (ppb)
ground-level ozone measured over an 8-hour period). The 1997 standard was 80 ppb. 62 FED.
REG. 38,856 (July 18, 1997).
108
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1148 (referring to these areas as “orphan
nonattainment areas”).
109
73 Fed. Reg. 16,346, ___.
110
South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1147-1151.
111
42 U.S.C.
107
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stationary sources of air pollution.112 In 1990, Congress overhauled the Clean Air
Act, adding new titles and hundreds of pages’ worth of changes; among these were
added provisions and new language in Section 202.113
The new language in 1990 established a progressive and non-regressive
principle to be applied to any changes in pollution standards for mobile sources like
cars and trucks. Congress specifically addressed the question of revising motor
vehicle emissions standards that the EPA had already put in place, including the
following sentence: “Any revised standard shall require a reduction of emissions
from the standard that was previously applicable.”114 This was in keeping with the
overall tenor of the 1990 amendments. Members of Congress who drafted the
legislation viewed with disapproval the way in which air pollution standards had
languished in the 1980s after a decade of progressive movement in the 1970s.115
Therefore, the 1990 statute provided much clearer, more specific directions to the
EPA, limiting discretion for changes and providing detailed lists of pollutants and
other priorities for the agency to address.116
The Trump Administration’s changes to fuel economy standards and GHG
emissions from cars have put this non-regression provision to the test.117 The joint
EPA/NHTSA rules for new cars for the model years 2021-2026, finalized in April
2020, are lower that what had originally been established through 2025 by the
Obama Administration (in conjunction with the state of California, upon an
agreement with major auto manufacturers after the 2008 financial crisis and
recession).118 However, based on the non-regression requirement in Section 202,
the agencies’—even in their deregulatory zeal—could not actually lower fuel
economy requirements (in comparison to what applied in prior years), but simply
set in place a weaker increase in fuel economy, at a slower pace over the next
several years.119 While the Trump Administration’s decision was a rollback in
relation to the future standards that had been put in place eight years earlier, the
statute at a minimum prevented regression in absolute terms.
In a more recent example, Congress enacted a non-regression standard for
motor vehicle emissions in the context of blending with biofuels. The Energy Policy
112

Pub. L. 89-272, 77 Stat. 392 (1965). On the history of the various additions and amendments to
the Clean Air Act, see U.S. EPA, Evolution of the Clean Air Act, https://www.epa.gov/clean-airact-overview/evolution-clean-air-act (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
113
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 2472-83.
114
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(C).
115
See, e.g., Gary C. Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics, at [].
116
For example, the 1990 amendments to the hazardous air pollutants program in Section 112 of
the Clean Air Act included a list of nearly 200 specific toxic pollutants that the EPA became
required to regulate (rather than depending on the EPA to make individual, pollutant-by-pollutant
determinations that were slow in coming). See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
117
See U.S. EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model
Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020).
118
See U.S. EPA & NHTSA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (2012).
119
For a brief description of the Trump Administration’s final rule, see NHTSA, The Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient ‘SAFE’ Vehicles Rule, https://www.nhtsa.gov/corporate-average-fueleconomy/safe (last visited Feb. 23, 2021), (noting that the rule provides for fuel economy and
GHG “standards that increase 1.5% in stringency each year from model years 2021 through 2026).
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Act of 2005 created a Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) that mandated the blending
of renewable biofuels into the gasoline supply in the United States.120 This was
quickly expanded in 2007 under the Energy Independence and Security Act.121 The
updated RFS places an obligation on gasoline refiners to include an increasing
volume of renewable fuels, with a mandate for “advanced biofuels” that meet
stricter EPA-measured standards for reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below
gasoline.122 Overall, the RFS has been far less successful in inducing a transition to
low-GHG renewable fuels than envisioned in the 2007 statute, and has instead been
critiqued as a political favor to corn producers in the United States.123
While intended as an energy security and a climate mitigation measure, the
expanded RFS brought a variety of criticisms, both from the oil industry (concerned
about increased competition) and from environmentalists. Environmentalists have
been concerned that conversion of corn and other existing cropland to biofuel
production alters land use patterns in a way that encourages more intensive or
expansive agriculture elsewhere.124 In addition, higher concentration of ethanol
blended into gasoline affects engine performance in cars and trucks and changes
the emissions profile for these vehicles.125
As a result, in the 2007 statute, Congress called on EPA to undertake a
“study to determine whether the [RFS] will adversely impact air quality as a result
of changes in vehicle and engine emissions of air pollutants.”126 Congress followed
up in the statue with a requirement, after the study is complete, to “promulgate fuel
120

42 U.S.C. § 7545(o); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o).
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140 (amending 42 U.S.C. §
7545(o)). In addition to the anti-backsliding requirement in the RFS program, the EISA also
reinforced a progressive obligation for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s
(NHTSA) in setting fuel economy standards for new passenger cars and light trucks. Id. § 102(a)
(adding 49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)(C)) (“Progress Toward Standard Required. . . . [T]he Secretary
shall prescribe annual fuel economy standard increases that increase the applicable average fuel
economy standard ratably beginning with model year 2011 and ending with model year 2020.”)
(emphasis added). NHTSA’s fuel economy standards are set together with the EPA’s regulation of
automobile GHG emissions. See U.S. EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient
(SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG.
24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020).
122
Under the EISA, all renewable fuels must result in 20 percent lower GHG emissions than
gasoline based on EPA’s lifecycle analysis; “advanced biofuels” must meet a 50 percent reduction
standard. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(o)(1)(B), 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). In addition to the requirements for
gasoline, the statute also includes a smaller mandate for the use of biodiesel.
123
The renewable fuels program in the Clean Air Act has created a continued, guaranteed market
for a large quantity of corn-based ethanol in gasoline, which qualifies for the 20 percent standard
but not the 50 percent advanced biofuels standard. The statute gives EPA considerable flexibility
to waive the requirements, which has resulted in frequent waivers that undermine any technologyforcing element of the RFS.
124
See, e.g., Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse
Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238 (2008).
125
For example, the EPA considered these impacts in 2019 while expanding the “waiver” under
the Clean Air Act for the use of E15 gasoline in a greater variety of vehicles and circumstances
(gasoline that contains 15% ethanol, as opposed to the typical E10 or 10% ethanol). See U.S. EPA,
Modifications to Fuel Regulations to Provide Flexibility for E15; Modifications to RFS RIN
Market Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 26980 (June 10, 2019).
126
42 U.S.C. § 7545(v)(1)(A).
121
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regulations to implement appropriate measures to mitigate, to the greatest extent
achievable, considering the results of the study . . . any adverse impacts on air
quality, as the result” of the RFS, unless the EPA makes “a determination that no
such measures are necessary.127
EPA’s understanding of this provision in the Clean Air Act reflects the nonregression principle. The agency itself refers to the study as the “Anti-backsliding
Study.”128 With this requirement, Congress has recognized that when it tweaks
regulatory programs for air pollution, the intent is to ensure that there is no
regression or walking back of progress made. Even while adding another goal to
the Clean Air Act (i.e., encouraging the use of renewable fuels to enhance U.S.
energy independence and reduce GHG emissions from fossil fuels), the statute
prescribes a way to ensure that complementary environmental regulations for
conventional tailpipe emissions from motor vehicles remain effective and as
protective as before.
In short, major federal environmental statutes in the United States are
organized around a principle of non-regression. The Clean Air Act, Clean Water
Act, and other major regulatory programs are geared toward progressive realization
of human health goals and improvement in environmental quality. Where areas
remain relatively unaffected by pollution, the statutes provide for maintenance and
protection;129 in areas suffering the impacts from decades or centuries of
development and industrial activity, the statutes contain policies for continual
improvement, even if many of the most ambitious goals have yet to be realized.130
B. Administrative Law as Non-Regression
As discussed throughout this Article, the non-regression principle in
environmental law is not absolute. As one principle among others in a legal system,
the non-regression principle bars the weakening or revocation of legal protections
unless those changes are adequately justified—whether by new scientific and
policy understanding of human health and environmental challenges or by conflicts
between existing environmental legal protections and other public needs that
outweigh the public’s environmental interests.
In the United States, one key function of administrative law is judicial
oversight of administrative agencies’ use and application of scientific or technical
information in the implementation of regulatory and statutory mandates.131
Although courts are generally deferential to agencies on these questions,
administrative law doctrine requires them to take a hard look at agencies’
127

Id. § 7545(v)(2).
US E.P.A., Clean Air Act Section 211(v)(1) Anti-backsliding Study, EPA-420-R-20-008 (May
2020), available at https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100ZBY1.pdf.
129
See, e.g., the Clean Air Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” program for areas
currently in attainment of the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492.
130
The Clean Water Act, for example, called for a complete elimination of water pollution—a
mandate of zero discharge by 1985. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (“it is the national goal that the
discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985”).
131
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (establishing the scope of judicial review of agency actions, findings, and
conclusions).
128
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decisions.132 When those decisions threaten a regression from established
environmental protections, administrative law takes on a non-regressive character
and represents the most frequent U.S. application of the non-regression principle in
practice.
Administrative law doctrine in the United States under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)133 is based on principles of transparency and rationality in
government agency decisionmaking. The APA, as the name suggests, lays out
procedural requirements for government agencies to follow in fulfilling their
respective mandates and implementing federal statutes and programs. Critically,
however, the APA also provides a cause of action for interested parties to challenge
agency action and seek judicial review. Section 706 of the APA describes the
relevant standard of review; for judicial review of substantive decisions in
“informal”134 rulemaking and adjudicatory processes, this judicial inquiry is known
as the arbitrary and capricious standard.135
On its face, the arbitrary and capricious standard is neither pro- nor antiregulatory. Yet this neutral standard has evolved into a form of non-regression-lite
in practice: once administrative agencies put environmental or public health
protections in place, they tend to “stick”136 because scientific evidence will rarely
support walking back those regulatory protections.137 While administrative law
does not contain an explicit non-regression mandate, statutory and case law in this
area largely follows the principle, allowing regressive decisions only in the

132

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
5 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq.
134
The APA provides for formal, trial-like processes for certain categories of adjudications or
rulemaking processes. See 5 U.S.C. § 556, 557. In common administrative law parlance,
“informal” action refers to a rulemaking or adjudication that is not subject to these procedural
requirements. The rest of the APA and any other subject matter-specific statutory procedures still
apply.
135
As explained below, the Administrative Procedure Act has served as a strong, nearly
constitutional-like foundation for administrative law in the United States since its enactment in
[1946]. See generally [U.S. Atty Gen. Manual on the APA]. It directs courts to set aside agency
action that is, among other things, “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or beyond the scope of constitutional
or congressionally delegated statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). In common usage, the
standard in Section 706(2)(A) is flattened as “arbitrary and capricious” review.
136
See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2018).
137
For examples of this, one need only look at one of the dozens of cases since 2017 in which
courts have struck down Trump Administration efforts to revoke or stay the implementation of
environmental regulations. Administrative law doctrine generally defers to agency actions,
interpretations, and decisionmaking, and yet the Trump Administration has had a shockingly low
success rate of 12 out of 110 (11%) in court cases reviewing federal agency actions as of July
2020. See Institute for Policy Integrity, Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts,
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited Aug. 14, 2020). On the Trump
Administration’s aggressive use of a variety of different tactics to roll back administrative agency
rules and policies, see Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2019); Bethany A. Davis Noll & Alec Dawson, Deregulation Run Amok
(Institute for Policy Integrity 2018), https://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/deregulationrun-amok.
133
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exceptional case—in circumstances when justified or, in some instances, when
courts have opted to defer to agencies’ deregulatory policy objectives.138
Under the APA, agencies that promulgate rules of general applicability (the
case for most environmental regulatory actions taken by the EPA and
environmentally-consequential actions by land management agencies) must follow
at least three steps: providing notice to the public of a proposed rule or action;
receiving public input via submitted written comments and/or hearings; and the
publication of the final rule or action, typically in the Federal Register.139
Broadly speaking, when an agency that has an environmental regulation in
place seeks to make a change, administrative law does not permit that agency to
instantly revoke the current regulation. The procedural essence of administrative
law requires that every action follow the proper pathway.140 The Supreme Court, in
State Farm and subsequent precedents, has made clear that a decision to revoke or
walk back a regulation triggers the APA’s rulemaking provisions and requires the
same procedural steps to act as the decision to regulate in the first place.141
The process by itself does not establish a principle of non-regression in
administrative law decisions regarding the environment. An agency can choose to
follow the same steps used by predecessors and revoke or withdraw an
environmentally protective rule. However, the process sets up the APA’s
substantive constraint on administrative decisionmaking—judicial review.142
In carrying out the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, administrative
agencies must engage with and make decisions based on the evidence before
them.143 The Supreme Court has applied the arbitrary and capricious standard in the
APA as a means for ensuring that those decisions are rational or reasonable
conclusions, adequately based on the evidence and on congressional directives.144
Two of the Court’s listed factors in the arbitrary and capricious test in State Farm
are indicative: “Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offered
Chevron deference, of course, in its namesake case, was about deference to the EPA’s
deregulatory reinterpretation of the Clean Air Act in a way that served a particular policy goal of
flexibility for regulated industry. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
139
5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing for the rulemaking process).
140
The APA includes defines “rule making” to include “agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule,” making clear that the same procedural requirements apply when an
agency wants to repeal a prior rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
141
See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (invalidating an agency decision to undo safety restraint requirements for motor vehicles).
142
The APA provides jurisdiction for judicial review of “final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, for
those who are “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute”). Id. § 702. Section 706 describes the
scope and standards for judicial review. Id. § 706.
143
Agencies must be able to justify their decisions based on the record before them at the time the
decision was made, rather than by post hoc rationalizations. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80 (1943) (commonly referred to as Chenery I). In State Farm, the Court understood Chenery II to
say that a “reviewing court . . . may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (commonly referred to as Chenery
II).
144
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
138
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an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency
. . . .”145
The arbitrary and capricious standard, in practice, operates as a nonregression mandate any time an agency attempts to rescind an existing
environmental standard. The first time an agency moves to implement an
environmental statute, it will be operating on a clean slate. Judicial deference
doctrines are, in these circumstances, strong: generalist judges are loath to
substitute their judgment for that of technical experts.146 What happens, then, when
an agency revises or rolls back an existing regulation in its second or third crack at
the issue?
In theory, in administrative law jurisprudence, a court’s review of an
agency’s “second try” regulation follows the same standard as that for the first. In
FCC v. Fox, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court’s plurality that not “every agency
action representing a policy change must be justified by reasons more substantial
than those required to adopt a policy in the first instance.”147 However, in practice,
the bell of regulation cannot be un-rung, and the field is no longer level. Challengers
to the regulatory regression have the added ammunition of pointing to a full and
complete administrative record of the agency’s first decision to regulate—one that
likely passed muster in earlier judicial review.
Recognizing this, a more practical reading of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Fox
reflects a reality that there will often be a preference for non-regression. Although
a decision to rescind a rule may not be subject to greater scrutiny than the decision
to regulate, the Court still maintained that an agency must “display awareness that
it is changing position.”148 Even if the agency does not need to prove that there are
“better” reasons for the revocation than the original policy, “the agency must show
that there are good reasons for the new policy.”149
In effect, for an environmental regulation, this means that an agency cannot
simply ignore the evidence in front of it that had supported an environmental
restriction or standard in the first place.150 Unless there is new or updated scientific
understanding, the decisionmakers must still account for the evidence that
supported the original protection of public health or the environment.151 Consider
again the example of the joint EPA/NHTSA fuel economy standards for new
cars.152 The relevant statute for NHTSA requires that the agency set the standard at
“the maximum feasible average fuel economy that the [agency] decides the
manufacturers can achieve in that model year.”153 In this statute, Congress leaves
the factfinding to the agency as expert, providing guidelines as to how a

145

Id.
See id.
147
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).
148
Id. at 515 (emphasis in original).
149
Id.
150
Id.; see also Davis Noll & Revesz, supra note 137, at 6-7.
151
Fox, 556 U.S. at 516 (“[A] reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and
circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.”)
152
See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
153
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
146
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determination of “maximum feasible” is to be made.154 The agency must make
tradeoffs among several factors in deciding what is feasible.
Given a clean slate, two different administrations could reasonably come up
with different answers. When the Obama Administration’s NTHSA and EPA first
set rules for model year cars through 2025, the agencies put together a robust
explanation of the feasibility of a high fuel economy standard.155 That explanation
was reaffirmed in January 2017.156 Shortly thereafter, Trump Administration
officials at the agencies indicated that they would be revising those findings,157 and
in 2020, the new rule—with a significantly lower level of fuel economy averages
required—was finalized.158
Deferential judicial review—neutral as to the environmental impacts of any
change—looks simply at whether the agency provided an adequate justification for
the new rule.159 That is the Fox test. But the substantive statutory standard—
“maximum feasible average fuel economy”—has not changed, and the agencies’
prior findings remain part of the record. As a result, because Congress set the level
at the “maximum,” an objective review of such a rolled-back regulation will require
employing the non-regression principle. Without new scientific or technical
information that calls the earlier decision into question, or without a clear showing
that other, more significant principles or public concerns outweigh the
environmental considerations, no rolled-back standard can possibly be a reasonable
implementation of the statute’s clear mandate.
The result of this review is consistent with other expressions of the nonregression principle discussed in this Article. That is, the principle is not an
unqualified rule, and does not prevent or prohibit all forms of legal regression with
regard to environmental protection.160 However, any walking back of
environmental standards must be justified with evidence showing that the new
decision will not harm the environment or public health and/or that the regressive
action is supported by principles and welfare concerns greater than that guaranteed
by the non-regression principle.
Administrative law doctrine in the United States therefore includes a form
of non-regression principle. This has become more significant in recent years, given
the frequency of policymaking by agencies and the decline in congressional

The statute requires NHTSA to consider “technological feasibility, economic practicability, the
effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy.” Id. § 32902(f).
155
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (2012).
156
U.S. EPA, Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year 2022-2025 Lightduty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Under the Midterm Evaluation (Jan. 2017),
EPA-420-R-17-001.
157
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the MidTerm Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty
Vehicles, 82 FED. REG. 14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017).
158
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model
Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020).
159
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
160
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
154
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decisionmaking.161 However, the administrative law principle is limited in scope.
The non-regression principle comes not from any constitutional mandate, but rather
from the strength of the substantive environmental statutes (with language such as
“maximum”162 and “best”163) and the standard of judicial review.164 While
administrative law restrains arbitrary decisions to revoke environmental
protections, judicial review of agency actions does not provide any constraint on
legislative action.
IV.

CRITIQUES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION

The examples above in international and national-level law illustrate the
widespread use and recognition of the non-regression principle in environmental
law, regardless of whether it is so named explicitly in constitutions and
jurisprudence. There are at least two criticisms of the principle that warrant
discussion here before moving further: one normative and one descriptive. A
theoretical and normative challenge to the principle is what may seem to be a
conflict with democratic values. Non-regression restricts policy options that can be
taken in the future, even if withdrawing or rolling back environmental protection
might be, on some occasion, democratically favored. Second, descriptively, the
major environmental rollbacks in the past several years that have occurred in the
United States and in other major countries (developed and developing), such as
Australia and Brazil, do call into question the effect and significance of the
principle—or at least the extent to which it is obeyed in practice.
In grappling with the role of the non-regression principle in environmental
law, these are valid issues to engage with. Democratic process limits the nonregression principle because, absent some justification, future decisionmakers
ought to be able to change the course set out today. However, concern about the
enjoyment of environmental rights and about the environmental and human health
consequences from the undoing of law in the future are precisely the sort of
circumstances that justify a departure from the typical majoritarian rules. Further,
recent rollbacks highlight the importance of this work in establishing the legitimacy
of the principle and the need to reinforce it, to make it more durable.
Acknowledging and implementing the principle, while recognizing that it has not
been universally respected, is nonetheless a key step in fulfilling human rights with
regard to environmental protection.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODERNIZING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 3
(2020) (discussing proposals for APA reform and noting an “imbalance” in the prevalence of
regulatory action vs. congressionally enacted statutes); see also Davis Noll & Revesz, supra note
137 (addressing expanded use of tools by presidents to thwart predecessors’ regulatory actions in
the context of a declining number of congressional statutes).
162
49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
163
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (application of the “best system of emission reduction” in the Clean Air
Act’s New Source Performance Standards); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (requiring Endangered Species
Act listing decisions to be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific and commercial data
available”)
164
5 U.S.C. § 706.
161
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A. Democracy and Non-Regression
On the surface, democratic values and generally accepted processes for
legislative decisionmaking in democratic systems may appear to conflict with the
principle of non-regression. To summarize this challenge in two questions: to what
extent may a government or legislature bind future decisionmakers? Is it antidemocratic to prohibit a future legislature or executive authority from revoking or
altering environmental laws and policies?
In general, a foundational principle in democratic systems is the idea that a
representative legislative body that acts may repeal that act by following the same
process. When a statute is enacted with an environmental standard or a piece of
legislation sets aside a geographic area for preservation, the implication is that the
same decisionmaking body may change its mind and reverse course. In other words,
statutory law does not typically provide a vested right to the continuation of that
law.165 Under the non-regression principle, on the contrary, once a level of
environmental restriction is applied, future action cannot undo it. Future hands are
tied.
This critique of the non-regression principle merits response, but does not
defeat the principle. Small-d democrats may wish to avoid a “dead hand” problem
that ties current policy to previous conservation efforts.166 However, failure to
incorporate a non-regression principle into decisionmkaing means that future
generations are potentially exposed to the same or worse environmental harms that
today threaten a panoply of human rights.
Dworkin’s description of legal principles includes the idea that any one
principle will exist and function in tension with other principles and with other legal
considerations.167 This equitable weighing is both expected and consistent with the
rule of law. Constitutional democracy introduces a hierarchy among legal rules,
limiting the discretion of lawmakers in the normal, legitimate and democratic
legislative process to actions within the scope of constitutional authority—binding
democratic bodies to a previously identified set of norms.
Returning to the Costa Rican application of the non-regression principle,
the judiciary has recognized that the principle is simply one among a set of
constitutionally grounded restrictions on legislative decisionmaking.168 The
substance of that restriction depends on the law or norm previously put in place—
i.e., the level of environmental protection that cannot be walked back without
sufficient justification.
Judges can indeed apply the principle of non-regression consistently with
democratic governance, just as they treat any defined right that might be abridged
by government action. Perhaps the most important reason why a polity may
enshrine fundamental rights in a constitutional document is to prevent future action
See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Le Principe de Non Regression “Au Coeur” du Droit de l’Homme a
l’Environnement, 1 REVISTA DE DIREITO E SUSTENTABILIDADE 133, 134 (2015) (Braz.).
166
On the dead hand problem generally in constitutional law, see, for example, Andrew Coan, The
Dead Hand Revisited, 70 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 1 (2020).
167
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 26.
168
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
165
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that jeopardizes the exercise of such rights—even and perhaps especially when the
action is approved by democratic means.169 The concept of human rights per se
envisions this antidemocratic problem, placing negative limitations and positive
obligations on state action, even in states with democratic decisionmaking
processes.170 The use of the non-regression principle to overturn a deregulatory
action—in furtherance of the human right to a healthy environment—is no different
than relying on any other constitutional human right to block a majority-supported
infringement to that right.
The judiciary can apply the principle by requiring proportionality and
adequate justification for any action that implicate rights guaranteed by the state.
In the environmental context, as the Costa Rican court held, environmental
protection can only be rolled back if supported by scientific evidence or indication
that other countervailing public interests are at stake.171 Critically, applying the
non-regression principle means that the decisionmaker seeking to walk back
environmental law must bear the burden of proof in establishing how and why the
action is justified—e.g., how the balance of environmental interests at hand should
be resolved with other recognized legal principles and considerations that safeguard
public wellbeing. In this way, present laws and environmental regulations can claim
binding authority on future leaders without running afoul of democratic ideals.
B. Recent Regressions
Setting aside critiques about whether the non-regression principle infringes
on democratic decisionmaking, the non-regression principle runs up against a
recent track record of backtracking on environmental commitments. Some of these
recent rollbacks raise questions about whether strict obedience to the nonregression principle can be maintained when political pressure is strong. The
problematic present state of environmental politics suggests a strong need to
reinforce the principle of non-regression—first by clearly articulating what it is and
where it has worked, but second by grounding it in constitutional provisions, rights,
and other means. If constitutional rights can serve as an effective response to
regressions in one country, those experiences can provide guidance for other legal
systems to do the same. And in the United States, the story of the Trump
Administration to highlight is the robustness of the administrative law framework
in staving off the systematic regression of environmental protections, even if it did
not do so perfectly.
1. Four Years of Rollbacks in the United States
169

See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (on the countermajoritarian
difficulty of judicial review).
170
Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan describe the case for countermajoritarian judicial review as follows:
“[J]udicial review authority serves as a mechanism that ensures adherences to [a society’s] chosen
course, even against the current desires of the public. Thus, the [countermajoritarian] nature of
judicial review authority is understood as a virtue, since it ensures society will continue in the
right direction.” Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?, 11 INT’L
J. CONST. L. 13 (2013), available at https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/11/1/13/776170.
171
See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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In the United States, the essence of the Trump Administration’s
environmental policy from 2017 to 2021 was the repeated violation of the nonregression principle. The list of examples—rollbacks announced, begun (and never
finished), or completed—is so extensive that not even a partial treatment can be
made here.172 Various institutions and publications dedicated major resources and
efforts to track the status of environmental deregulatory actions.173 The most
significant of these regressions include the United States’ (temporary) departure
from the Paris Agreement on climate change;174 the rescission and replacement of
the Clean Power Plan (regulation of CO2 emissions from coal- and natural gas-fired
power plants);175 presidential proclamations slashing the size of national
monuments designated for the preservation of desert ecosystems and Native
American sacred cultural and archaeological sites in Utah;176 and the push to reduce
standards for fuel economy and GHG emissions from cars177—the single action
172

See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka, & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The Trump
Administration Is Reversing 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environment-rollbacks.html.
173
Harvard Law School maintained a website that tracks federal environmental regulations that
have been or are in the process of being revoked or rolled back, as well as the status of litigation
challenging these regulatory changes. See Harvard Environmental & Energy Law Program,
Regulatory Rollback Tracker, https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/ (last visited
Feb. 26, 2021). The tracker now also covers re-regulatory efforts under the Biden Administration.
Id.
174
President Trump and his first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, prioritized the exit from Paris as
an early statement of the Administration’s isolationist policy on climate change, announcing the
U.S. withdrawal in 2017. The United States formally submitted its withdrawal from the agreement
to the UN on November 4, 2019; per the terms of the agreement, the withdrawal took effect one
year later, on November 4, 2020. See Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-parisagreement-climate.html. Upon his inauguration, one of President Biden’s first acts was to sign a
one-paragraph statement re-accepting and re-joining the Paris Agreement. White House Briefing
Room, Paris Climate Agreement (Jan. 20, 2021), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/paris-climateagreement/.
175
U.S. E.P.A., Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines
Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July 8, 2019) (referred to as the “Affordable
Clean Energy” Rule or ACE), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-07-08/pdf/201913507.pdf.
176
Proclamation No. 9681, Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument (Dec. 4, 2017);
Proclamation No. 9682, Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument (Dec. 4,
2017). The author and others have argued that these executive actions diminishing the size of the
monuments are illegal. See Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner, & Sean B. Hecht,
Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV.
ONLINE 55 (2017).
177
U.S. E.P.A. & Dep’t of Transportation, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles
Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174 (Apr. 30,
2020). This includes the EPA’s effort, contested in court, to revoke the state of California’s
authority to regulate GHG emissions from cars as well as the state’s existing Clean Air Act waiver
covering its program for conventional tailpipe emissions. See U.S. E.P.A. & Dep’t of
Transportation, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National
Program, 84 Fed. Reg. 51310 (Sept. 27, 2019). On the California wavier, see Nicholas Bryner &
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from the Obama Administration that had the greatest projected impact in mitigating
climate change.178
Of course, this was not the first time that the United States had experienced
regression in environmental protection. Many of the Trump Administration’s
tactics, especially in its first year in2017, were reminiscent of the first term of the
Reagan Administration in the early 1980s.179 In parallel, both administrations
installed some agency leaders (in cabinet-level and other positions, and throughout
the government, not only in environmental agencies) openly hostile to the mission
of implementing congressionally enacted environmental laws.180
Out of the Reagan era came some environmental regressions, but also came
a more resilient environmental legal framework. Both the State Farm and Chevron
cases described earlier are products of this time.181 State Farm, while neutral on its
face, operates with pro-regulatory and progressive-oriented statutes as a bulwark
against regression.182 Chevron, for its part, allowed the EPA the flexibility to take
an environmentally regressive statutory interpretation.183 Adherence to the nonregression principle—in tandem with a statutory interpretation method cognizant
of environmental impacts184—would have altered the outcome in Chevron.
However, in the intervening decades of legislative stagnation, deference to agencies
has more often fostered pro-regulatory moves; not coincidentally, the sharpest
criticism in the past several years comes from conservative, rather than liberal
jurists.185
2. Worldwide Environmental Regression

Meredith Hankins, Trump Administration and California are on Collision Course over Vehicle
Emissions Rules, THE CONVERSATION, Aug. 2, 2018, https://theconversation.com/trumpadministration-and-california-are-on-collision-course-over-vehicle-emissions-rules-100574.
178
See, e.g., Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama Emission
Standards, THE HILL, Aug. 2, 2018 (noting that “the Obama rules [covering 2012-2025 model
year cars] were estimated to reduce emissions by 6 billion metric tons” over the life of those
vehicles).
179
See, e.g., Leif Fredrickson et al., History of US Presidential Assaults on Modern Environmental
Health Protection, 108 Am. J. Pub. Health 595 (2018), available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5922215/; Dan Farber, It’s Déjà Vu All Over
Again, LEGAL PLANET (Dec. 20, 2016), https://legal-planet.org/2016/12/20/its-deja-vu-all-overagain-2/.
180
On the trajectory of President Trump’s first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, including the
various scandals that preceded his resignation, see Jeremy Diamond, Eli Watkins, & Juana
Summers, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Amid Scandals, Citing ‘Unrelenting Attacks,’ CNN.com
(July 5, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/scott-pruitt-epa-resigns/index.html.
181
Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
182
See supra Part III.B.
183
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845, 857-59.
184
See Nicholas S. Bryner, An Ecological Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 3
(2018)
185
See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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Several other countries have elected leaders in the past decade who have
prioritized similar rollbacks. In Australia, for example, Labor Party leaders put in
place a carbon pricing scheme, which began in 2012 as a fixed-price tax per metric
ton of GHGs emitted and was planned to transition toward a cap-and-trade climate
regulatory system.186 However, the carbon tax was short-lived: following an
election campaign that turned in part on the policy, Liberal Party leaders came to
power and quickly repealed the program in 2014.187 Thus, in Australia, the highest
per-capita GHG emitter among major developed countries, climate policy has since
languished.188 In Bolivia, despite legal advances in the recognition of
environmental and indigenous rights, as well as the rights of nature,189 the past
decade has also been marked by regressions in legal protections. These include
changes in protected areas that relax environmental restrictions and decisions to
grant permits and licenses for the construction of environmentally damaging
transportation infrastructure and pipelines, as well as for the carrying out of
extractive industry projects.190
In Brazil, the past decade has also been marked by pushes to relax legal
protections on forested lands. Since 1965, the country’s Forest Code has maintained
strict limits on the clearing of rural forested land, preserving riparian zones and the
headwaters of streams and rivers.191 In 2012, despite objections from environmental
organizations in the country, Brazil revised its Forest Code, maintaining strict limits
on the clearing of rural forested land generally, but expanding exemptions and

186

See, e.g., Claudia Irigoyen, Case Study: The Carbon Tax in Australia, Centre for Public Impact,
May 5, 2017, https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/case-study/carbon-tax-australia/ (describing
the history leading up to Australia’s Clean Energy Act of 2011, the basic elements of the program,
and the subsequent backlash); Australia Introduces Controversial Carbon Tax, BBC NEWS, July
1, 2012, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18662560.
187
See, e.g., Lenore Taylor, Australia Kills Off Carbon Tax, THE GUARDIAN, July 16, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-kills-off-carbon-tax (reporting on
the Australian Senate’s vote to repeal the tax and citing then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s
“‘pledge in blood’ to ‘axe the tax’”).
188
See, e.g., Charles Komanoff, Australia’s Brief, Shining Carbon Tax, Carbon Tax Center (Jan.
7, 2020), https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2020/01/07/australias-brief-shining-carbon-tax/.
189
Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo Integral para Vivir Bien, Ley No. 300, de 15 de
octubre de 2012 (Bolivia), available at http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/FAOcountries/Bolivia/docs/Ley_300.pdf.
190
See, e.g., Paola D. Cortés Martinez, El Estado de Derecho Ambiental, el Rol de la Justicia y la
Importancia del Principio de No Regresión en Materia Ambiental, Sept. 8, 2020,
https://paoladcortesm.wordpress.com/2020/09/08/el-estado-de-derecho-ambiental-el-rol-de-lajusticia-y-la-importancia-del-principio-de-no-regresion-en-materia-ambiental/. These actions have
taken place both under the government of President Evo Morales and the interim government of
Jeanine Áñez that began leading the country following his ouster in 2019. On the political crisis in
Bolivia and its ramifications, see, for example, Anatoly Kurmanaev, In Bolivia, Interim Leader
Sets Conservative, Religious Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/world/americas/bolivia-anez-morales.html.
191
Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de setembro de 1965 (Braz.), superseded by Lei No. 12.651, de 25 de
maio de 2012. The author has discussed Brazilian court decisions interpreting the Forest Code in
Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court: Environmental Law in the Superior Tribunal de Justiça
(High Court of Brazil), 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 470, 486-496 (2012).
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providing immunity for landholders that had cleared forests in the past.192 While
the federal government under President Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party from 2002
and 2010 had devoted significant resources and political capital to controlling
deforestation in the Amazon, the cattle ranching and agricultural lobbies grew in
political power in the Party’s governing coalition under President Dilma
Rousseff.193
Current Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, elected in 2018, has been openly
hostile toward existing environmental laws, halting the demarcation of indigenous
lands in the forests and appointing officials uninterested in enforcing the Forest
Code or other statutory requirements.194 The result of the rollback in legal
requirements and in enforcement is a new, sharp rise in deforestation. 195 Although
deforestation rates remain below the historic highs in the late 1980s, 1990s, and
early 2000s, the slowdown in forest clearing has stopped, and in the period from
2012-2019, has climbed back up—the trend accelerating since President Bolsonaro
took office.196
3. Re-establishing the Principle
As a descriptive matter, recent actions like the above raise questions as to
whether decision-makers are likely to be influenced by the principle of nonregression in environmental law. Dramatic environmental policy changes arise
when governments transition, particularly when those transitions are led by leaders
from different political parties and ideologies. Political change coincides with
political pressure to change course or undo the policies of predecessors, as has been
the case in the United States, Brazil, and other countries that have taken a ‘right
turn’ toward anti-conservation chief executives.197

192

Lei No. 12.651, de 25 de maio de 2012 [CÓDIGO FLORESTAL] (Braz.), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12651.htm.
193
For example, President Rousseff appointed Kátia Abreu, a noted figure among the ruralista
voting bloc in Congress that pushed for revision of the Forest Code, as Minister of Agriculture in
2014. See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, Brazil’s ‘chainsaw queen’ appointed new agriculture minister,
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 24, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/24/brazilagriculture-katia-abreu-climate-change.
194
See, e.g., Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, As Bolsonaro Keeps Amazon Vows, Brazil’s
Indigenous Fear ‘Ethnocide,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/world/americas/bolsonaro-brazil-amazon-indigenous.html
(reporting on the concerns of indigenous people in the State of Rondônia, in the Amazon Basin
near the border with Bolivia).
195
See Rhett A. Bulter, Amazon Deforestation Increases for 13th Straight Month in Brazil,
MONGABAY, May 9, 2020, https://news.mongabay.com/2020/05/amazon-deforestation-increasesfor-13th-straight-month-in-brazil/.
196
See id.
197
Even in December 2016, one month before President Trump’s inauguration, the stance of his
administration on environmental issues was clear, given the makeup of his transition team that had
been preparing to take control of various administrative agencies. See, e.g., Oliver Milman,
Trump’s Transition: Sceptics Guide Every Agency Dealing with Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec. 12, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/donald-trump-environmentclimate-change-skeptics.
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Calls for regression almost invariably include some form of the argument
that an increase in environmental protection represents a step backward for
economic development.198 Despite a great deal of evidence that this is a false
dichotomy,199 the zero-sum economic framing carries popular political weight.
The propensity for recent regressions in many parts of the world highlights
the great need for recognition of the non-regression principle in environmental law.
However, the idea that a legal principle can prevent these recursions on legal
protection for the environment during political transitions may seem idealistic.
Effectively making the connection between progressive application of
environmental law and the progressive realization of human rights can build
normative and political support to apply the principle of non-regression. Despite
failings in some respects, the legal response to many regressions over the past
several years has demonstrated the way in which the principle can and ought to
work in practice to safeguard environmental rights—laying out examples that can
be followed.
First, administrative law has proven an important bulwark against the
excesses of politically driven rollbacks, at least in recent years in the United
States.200 Hasty decisions to rescind or replace regulations ignored administrative
law procedure, failing to respond to the guideline embodied in the non-regression
principle—that is, that changes must be justified, either by scientific study that
demonstrates an environmental rule is no longer needed or on a deliberate, rational
determination that the change is of sufficient benefit to other public interests to
outweigh environmental considerations.201 The hasty nature of administrative
actions under President Trump, particularly in 2017, led to a remarkably poor
success rate for the administration in defending against challenges to deregulatory
action, despite strong deference doctrines in federal courts.202
Commitment to the non-regression principle signifies that popular political
pressure alone for rolling back environmental law is not a sufficient justification.
The idea of this, and similar legal principles (and constitutional decisionmaking) is
that it can resist short-term majoritarian impulses. Even in a legal system that does
not recognize a rights-based approach to environmental conservation, such as the
For example, in President Trump’s remarks in June 2017 regarding his intent to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement, the speech was replete with (highly dubious) claims about job losses and
economic impacts projected from U.S. compliance with the Agreement. Statement by President
Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, June 1, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
199
See, e.g., Marshall Burke, W. Matthew Davis, & Noah S. Diffenbaugh, Large Potential
Reduction in Economic Damages under UN Mitigation Targets, 557 NATURE 549 (2018)
(modeling net global economic benefits from mitigating climate change). In the United States,
cost-benefit analyses of every major environmental regulation since the 1980s demonstrate, time
and again, the economic benefit of reducing pollution; further, environmental regulatory
transitions typically do not have major long-term effects on employment in affected industries, or
may lead to net growth in other job sectors. See, e.g., Institute for Policy Integrity, Does
Environmental Regulation Kill or Create Jobs? (2017),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/Jobs_and_Regulation_Factsheet.pdf.
200
See Institute for Policy Integrity, supra note 137.
201
See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
202
See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
198
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United States, administrative law can slow down political decisions that harm
public interests. While some scholars have criticized the ‘ossification’ of
administrative decisionmaking in the U.S. system, the value of deliberate process
and a requirement for rational, expert decisionmaking, is that it can serve as a
counterweight to politicking that would undo socially beneficial regulation.203
In countries with constitutionally recognized human rights to environmental
protection, this dynamic—defending environmental law against short-term
politics—is ever clearer. The non-regression principle, as a corollary to the mandate
for progressive realization of environmental rights, means that the political
branches’ decisions are and ought to be constrained. Momentary political decisions
to weaken environmental protection would run roughshod over the environmental
rights of frontline communities and vulnerable minorities (as well as the diffuse
environmental rights enjoyed by all) and are therefore prohibited.
While setbacks and exceptions to the principle, in practice, are inevitable,
experience in human rights discourse generally suggests that raising attention to the
principle of non-regression—including an explanation of the examples and
applications referred to throughout this Article—can help develop the normative
case for the principle and build expectations for decisionmakers to implement it
and respect it.
V.

CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL NON-REGRESSION IN A PUBLIC HEALTH
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS

Environmental law today faces an additional challenge. In the face of
contemporary environmental backtracking in several countries—and in finding
appropriate responses to roll regulation forward—it is important to put the principle
of non-regression in the context of the covid-19 pandemic that has upended the
world and has led to devastating loss of life.204 The pandemic, as well as the
political and social responses to it, brought on a severe economic crisis, beginning
in the early months of 2020 and continuing as successive waves of infection hit
multiple countries around the world.205
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See generally Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1209 (2018)
(discussing various critiques of delay in administrative law and defending ossification as
beneficial to perceptions of agency legitimacy).
204
As of February 2021, as reported by Johns Hopkins University, the global total of deaths
related to covid-19 had surpassed 2.5 million, including over 500,000 deaths in the United States.
Johns Hopkins University Center for Systems Science and Engineering, COVID-19 Dashboard,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2021).
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In June 2020, the International Monetary Fund projected that the global economy would
decline by 4.9% for the year 2020. See Alan Rappeport, I.M.F. Predicts Deeper Global Downturn
Even as Economies Reopen, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/business/imf-world-economic-outlook.html. Surveys
indicate that consumer pessimism in many countries was worse in 2020 than at the height of the
Great Recession in 2008-2009. See Mara Mordecai & Shannon Schumacher, In Many Countries,
People are More Negative about the Economy Amid COVID-19 than During Great Recession,
Pew Research Center (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/14/inmany-countries-people-are-more-negative-about-the-economy-amid-covid-19-than-during-great-
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Environmental crises have exacerbated the human impact of covid-19, and
the economic impact of covid-19 threatens to undermine progress in environmental
law and policy—both by diverting all available resources and attention to
addressing the pandemic (in necessary ways) and by adding to the perceived
economic pressure to do away with burdensome or costly environmental
regulations.
Cautionary examples abound. In March 2020, early on in the U.S.
experience with the spreading virus, the EPA issued a memorandum with a
temporary enforcement policy during the pandemic that kneecapped the EPA
enforcement office’s ability to hold environmental violators accountable.206 The
memorandum applied the EPA’s enforcement discretion to signal to regulated
industries that the EPA would not be enforcing environmental monitoring
requirements:
In general, the EPA does not expect to seek penalties for violations
of routine compliance monitoring, integrity testing, sampling,
laboratory analysis, training, and reporting or certification
obligations in situations where the EPA agrees that COVID-19 was
the cause of the noncompliance and the entity provides supporting
documentation to the EPA upon request.207
In Brazil, the Environment Minister, Ricardo Salles, sparked outrage for
expressing that he saw the pandemic as an opportunity to jam through deregulatory
policies while the public and media were not paying attention.208 In a recording
from an April 2020 meeting, the Minister was overheard advocating for “efforts
now, while we have a quiet moment in terms of media coverage” of environmental
issues, to “push the herd of cattle through” the opening.209
The pandemic has caused a worldwide economic earthquake. Rapid
progress on the development of several vaccines has been encouraging, and
vaccination programs in at least some countries have brought hope of eventually
bring the public health crisis under control.210 Yet we are still locked in debates

recession/. (In Pew’s study, the United States was one exception, with 77% of Americans saying
the current economic situation was “bad” in 2008/2009 and 69% in 2020).
206
U.S. E.P.A., Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Memorandum: COVID-19
Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program (March 26, 2020),
available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202003/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf.
207
Id. at 3.
208
Ministro do Meio Ambiente defende passar 'a boiada' e 'mudar' regras enquanto atenção da
mídia está voltada para a Covid-19, GLOBO.COM (May 22, 2020),
https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/22/ministro-do-meio-ambiente-defende-passar-aboiada-e-mudar-regramento-e-simplificar-normas.ghtml.
209
Id. (my translation).
210
See, e.g., Smriti Mallapaty, Vaccines are Curbing COVID: Data from Israel Show Drop in
Infections, 590 NATURE 197 (2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00316-4.

39

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3947359

Bryner, Non-Regression

43 U. PA. J. INT’L L. ___ (forthcoming 2022)

about how to recover and reopen society and industry as we confront additional
waves of infections and new variants of the coronavirus.211
In what will assuredly be a prolonged recover process, we have the potential
to transform environmental law and policy. But based on experiences in the United
States, China, Brazil, and elsewhere, we have reason to worry. Economic recession
and recovery cycles have, as in the past, inevitably led to political pressure to cut
regulatory corners.
While the 2020s have begun as a worrisome decade, now is not a time for
backtracking. The principle of non-regression in environmental law is well
documented in national constitutions, statutes, and regulations; international
treaties and declarations; and in the theory and jurisprudence around human rights
and the environment. The purpose of this Article is in bringing together the variety
of legal expressions of environmental non-regression—to demonstrate that there is
indeed solid legal footing for applying the principle in political discussions and in
judicial review of regressive executive and legislative actions.
Moving forward, policymakers will need to grapple with the mismatch
between non-regression in environmental law—moving forward with two steps
forward for every step back—and rapid degradation of global environmental
conditions.212 Environmental law as its own field began with great purpose and
ambition in the first steps made 50 years ago.213 Yet sharp declines in biodiversity,
rising temperatures and seas, growing global GHG concentrations, water scarcity,
increased deforestation, a host of other problems—all appear, empirically, more
severe than just a decade ago.
As we traverse the long-term pandemic response throughout the world,
there will be better examples to follow as well. Economic recovery policies—if
designed with foresight—represent a rare opportunity to redirect governmental and
economic priorities to facilitate a just, green transition.214 At a time when fossil fuel
prices are low due to demand declines, economic stimulus could cut or eliminate
fossil fuel subsidies for exploration that is no longer economically viable and
instead invest public resources in putting people to work in building green
infrastructure, improving energy efficiency, and other areas where economic and
environmental interests align. The movement for a Green New Deal predates the
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US COVID-10 Cases Caused by Variants,
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2021) (tracking the reported cases of identified SARS-CoV-2 virus variants B.1.1.7, B.1.351, and
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See Tommy Koh, The Earth Summit’s Legacy: An Assessment (June 15, 2019),
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E.g., Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(1972); National Environmental Policy Act (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
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Ann Eisenberg’s thorough exposition of the “just transitions” movement describes two
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pandemic, but if successful, even in part, will drive a more environmentally
sustainable recovery.215
So long as environmental degradation continues—and so long as those
environmental impacts implicate human health, human life, and human rights—
those who develop environmental protection under the law must never look back.
The environmental rule of law requires respect for human rights and respect for the
principle of non-regression. May it guide us forward.
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